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The Nature, Attainments, Problems and Prospects of Canadian-Nigerian International
Human Rights Engagements: An Analytical Overview and Some Recommendations
By
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*

Abstract
By way of a fully developed conclusion, this article offers a broad analytical overview of the
insights that have been jointly and severally generated by the main sub-studies on which the
articles in this volume are based. It offers such overarching discussions, one after the other, in
relation to the nature, attainments, problems, and prospects of Canadian-Nigerian international
human rights engagements. Drawing upon these analytical insights, the article then makes some
pertinent recommendations that are addressed to the relevant stakeholders, especially in Canada
and Nigeria, i.e. policy-makers, practitioners and theorists alike (depending on which of the
itemized points they find relevant), regarding some ways of improving Canadian-Nigerian
international human rights engagements.

A. Introduction:
The study on which this volume is based was directed, in part, at mapping and analyzing the
nature, attainments, problems and prospects of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements
during the 1999 to 2011 period on which the research focused. Each of the separate subinvestigations that together constitute this study examined these questions in relation to a
particular sub-theme. These relevant sub-themes are: children’s rights, democratization, and
institution-building in relation to international criminal justice. Each such sub-study is thus
addressed toward improving our understanding of the nature, attainments, problems and
prospects of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements in relation to the sub-theme on which
it focuses. There is, therefore, a need to piece together from all these separate sub-studies the big
picture in relation to the overall findings of the research regarding the nature, attainments,

*

York Research in International and Transnational Legal Studies (Senior Tier), Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto, Canada; and former Chairperson, United Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee,
Geneva, Switzerland.

problems and prospects of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements during the period
under study. This is the first thing that is done in this article. The second thing that the article
does is to offer some recommendations that are grounded in the above-mentioned analytical
overview of the evidence.
As such, this article first provides an analytical overview of the broad insights that are
jointly produced by the afore-mentioned sub-investigations. It begins with a discussion of the
nature of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements during the relevant period. It then moves
on to a consideration of the attainments reached as a result of these engagements. Thereafter, it
discusses the problems that have affected the process. Following this, it reflects on the prospects
of such engagements going forward. In the end, a number of recommendations are offered.

B. The Nature of the Engagements:
Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements during the period under study have been
characterized by a number of salient features and orientations. First, these engagements have
occurred against the backdrop of a relatively long history of human rights engagement between
the two countries, and alongside an even longer history of Canadian-Nigerian relations in
general. And these are histories within which one must situate the human rights and other
engagements between these countries during the specific period under study here. As is well
known, Canada established diplomatic relations with Nigeria shortly after Nigeria’s
independence from British colonial rule in 1960. For its own part, Nigeria established full
diplomatic relations with Canada in 1973 when it opened its High Commission in Canada in
Ottawa. Partly as a result of their shared (though still distinguishable) histories of British colonial
rule, both countries have since then generally enjoyed cordial and strong bilateral relations.

These relations strengthened significantly in the last two or so years of the period under study
(i.e. between 2009-2011), leading to the conclusion after the relevant period of a 2012
Memorandum of Agreement on a Bi-National Commission; the subsequent convening and
holding of at least two high-level meetings of that Commission; and the adoption in 2014 of the
Canada-Nigeria Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement.1 Human rights have
been a part of the content of these agreements and the discussions leading up to them.
Importantly, for example, Canada played a key role in supporting the pro-democratic forces who
worked assiduously and courageously to pressure the Nigerian military rulers of the 1990s to quit
power and hand over the reins of government to the elected, civilian, Obasanjo-led government
in 1999.2 Canada even shut its embassy in Nigeria between 1997 and 1999 as part of this prodemocratic effort.3 Yet, as will soon become clear, Canadian-Nigerian bilateral relations have
not been evenly intense or visible over time.
Even more importantly, it should be noted here that there has been little, if any,
reciprocity in the Canadian/Nigerian relationship in the specific area of human rights promotion
and protection. While Canada has intervened quite appreciably in the human rights debates in,
and praxis of, Nigeria, there is very little – if any – evidence that the converse has been the case.
Nigeria has hardly, if ever, intervened in the human rights debates and practices in Canada.4 And
this has not been for a total want of opportunity. After all, despite the human rights situation in
Nigeria being more acutely concerning than that in Canada, there have always been many serious
human rights problems in Canada as well (e.g. in relation to the treatment of indigenous peoples,
See High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, “Canada – Nigeria Relations”, online:
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria_draft/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_nigeria.aspx?lang=en>.
2
See David Kilgour, “The Commonwealth: A Force for Change in Support of Democracy and Human Right,”
online: <http://www.david-kilgour.com/secstate/common2.htm> [Kilgour].
3
Ibid.
4
For a discussion on the possible theoretical foundations for this situation see Laura MacDonald, “Unequal
Partnerships: The Politics of Canada’s Relations with the Third World” (1995) 47 Studies in Political Economy 111.
1

racial minorities, and migrants). Rather, the absence of appreciable Nigerian reciprocity in this
connection may be better attributed to a range of other factors, including the socio-economic and
political power gradient in the relationship in favor of Canada, one that Nigeria would have had
to climb if it were to have any hope of intervening meaningfully in internal Canadian human
rights debates. For example, Canada is a G7 country while Nigeria (though it is Africa’s largest
economy by far) is not a member of that massively powerful group.5 And while Canada is
certainly not one of the great powers that operate in Africa and does not have the weight that the
USA, France and Britain do, it nevertheless does exert a significant measure of influence on that
continent, including within and on Nigeria.6 Perhaps as important a reason for this lack of
reciprocity in the Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship is Nigeria’s generally different
approach to foreign policy, something that has largely stemmed from a dissimilar sense of
national identity from Canada’s.7 Rarely do Third World countries such as Nigeria (widely
viewed as the “bad” human rights actors of the world) conceive of themselves as norm
entrepreneurs/leaders in relation to Western countries (which are widely and ideologically
regarded as the “good” human rights countries of the world).8 This has – as the articles in this

See Council on Foreign Relations, “The Group of Seven (G7),” online: <http://www.cfr.org/internationalorganizations-and-alliances/group-seven-g7/p32957>.
6
See Edward A Akuffo, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security, and
Development (Farnham, U.K: Ashgate, 2012) at 217 [Akuffo].
7
Canada’s foreign policy (at least toward African states such as Nigeria) has historically been framed by a kind of
“moral identity” that led it to – at the very least until more recently – theorize and generally practice what it sees as a
kind of “humane internationalism”. See Akuffo, ibid at 51. On the other hand, although Nigeria’s foreign policy also
constructs that country’s moral identity as a humane internationalist, it has for a very long time largely been “Africa
or at least third world-centered.” In any case, Nigeria’s moral identity in foreign relations has never really been
conceived in the same way as Canada’s. Nigeria does not see itself as a developed country with a moral calling to
help out countries like Canada. Rather, it sees itself as a richer developing country that ought to help out less
fortunate developing countries, as for example through its technical aid corps scheme. For example, see Ayo
Akinbobola & Tunde Adebowale, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in a Democracy: Challenges for the Future” (2001)
27:1-2 Nigerian J Int’l Affairs 243; and Gerald E Ezirim, “Xenophobia and Citizens’ Diplomacy: Call for
Reassessment of Nigeria’s Afrocentric Foreign Policy” (2008) 9 Int’l J Communication 1. See also Directorate of
Technical Aid Corps, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, online: <http://www.dtacng.com/inex.php>.
8
See Obiora C Okafor and Shedrack C Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining International Human Rights Education in Our
Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies” (2001) 14 Leiden J Int’l L 563 [Okafor & Agbakwa].
5

volume demonstrate – led to a heavily lop-sided, one-way traffic, in the human rights
engagements between Canada and Nigeria.
As importantly, the sub-areas of human rights that have been emphasized by Canada in
its human rights interventions in Nigeria have morphed since the end of military rule in Nigeria
in May 1999. The heavy emphasis in Canada’s interventions in Nigeria in the era preceding the
period under study (i.e. before May 1999) on freedom of association, freedom of expression,
freedom from detention, judicial independence, the end of military rule, and the like, has all but
given way to a very heavy and focused emphasis during the relevant period on child/maternal
health and democratic consolidation (largely through the administrative reform of the electoral
process).9 Now, emphasis on these areas has not, of course, meant the total neglect of all other
areas (such as accountability and religious freedom).10 The point though is that, unlike in the
past, the emphasis has been very heavy during the period under study on the child/maternal
health and electoral process aspects of human rights. This may, of course, be justified in
Canada’s eyes by the need to utilize its presumably scarce resources more effectively by
concentrating them in one or two main priority areas.11 It could also be justified by the fact that
Nigeria did transit to a form of quasi-democratic civilian rule in May 1999 (one that lasted at
least until the end of the Obasanjo/Yar-Adua regimes in 2010),12 and did later come to enjoy
significantly improved democratic rule during the Goodluck Jonathan Administration from 2010

9

See Kilgour, supra note 2.
Ibid.
11
Maternal and child health is clearly the development assistance priority of the Harper Government. For example
see, Government of Canada, “Saving Every Woman, Every Child: Within Arms Reach,” online:
<http://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/development-developpement/mnch-smne/leadership/savingsauvons.aspx?lang=eng> (describing this sub-area as “Canada’s top development priority”) [Saving Every Woman].
12
See Philip C Aka, “Nigeria since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule and Human Rights
Violations under President Olusegun Obasanjo” (2003) 4 San Diego Int’l LJ 209; and Obiora C Okafor, “The
Precarious Place of Labour Rights and Movements in Nigeria’s Dual Economic and Political Transition (19992005)” (2007) 51 J African L 68.
10

to 2015.13 These developments would have reduced greatly the need for any Canadian or other
interventions in the areas of freedom of expression, association and the like. Yet, it should be
noted that Canada’s very heavy emphasis on child/maternal health and the reform of the electoral
process in its human rights engagements with Nigeria has occurred at the same time as other
human rights issues, such as labor rights issues and anti-fuel price hike protests have loomed
quite large in Nigeria without these other issues being addressed in any significant way in
Canada’s interventions. Shifting the focus to the Nigerian perspective on the relationship,
needless to state that, as Nigeria has not really intervened in an appreciable way in Canada’s
human rights debates and practices, little, if anything, can be said here about any changes which
might or might not have occurred in the types of human rights themes that it has emphasized in
its relations with Canada.
Flowing from the analysis above, it also becomes clear that – at least from the Canadian
angle – the focus of Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements during the period under study
have been more narrow than broad. This may of course be explained, in part, by the significantly
fewer resources at Canada’s disposal as compared to say the USA, whose economy is far larger
in aggregate terms.14 However, this reasoning may not hold up to closer scrutiny if Canada’s
wealth is compared to say that of the UK (the size of whose economy is much closer to that of
Canada).15 Yet, unlike Canada, the UK’s human rights interventions in Nigeria have had a
significantly broader character. The UK has intervened in Nigeria in relation to a significantly
broader range of human rights themes, including maternal/child health, a theme that Canada has

13

For e.g. unlike during the Obasanjo/Yar-Adua era, there was not even one political prisoner or exile nor was there
a single incidence in which a democratically elected Governor was unlawfully impeached during this later era.
14
For example, Canada’s gross domestic product (GDP) was about US$1.8 trillion in 2013. By contrast, the USA’s
GDP was US$16.7 trillion. Thus the US economy is larger than the Canadian one by a factor of more than 16 times.
See World Bank, “Indicators,” online: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> [World Bank].
15
The UK’s GDP in 2013 was US$2.6 trillion, while Canada’s was US$1.8 trillion. See World Bank, ibid.

intensively prioritized, poverty in general, governance, education, water and sanitation, crime,
the justice system, disability, gender rights in general, etc.16 However, the narrowness of
Canada’s specialization in the maternal/child rights and electoral reform areas may not really be
a bad thing from the perspective of the governance autonomy of a third world country such as
Nigeria, which has tended to be at the receiving end of a barrage of foreign (largely Western)
human rights interventions and has thus tended to be “over-governed” from Western and other
foreign capitals/institutions.17 The point that is being made here, however, is that this narrowness
or lack of issue-broadness has nevertheless been an important feature or characteristic of
Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements during the period under study.
As is apparent from the evidence analyzed by most of the contributors to this volume,
Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements have – at least during the relevant period – been
largely driven and/or conducted at the intergovernmental level. And Canada’s interventions in
particular have not been purveyed as much by Canadian non-governmental actors as some might
have expected. Indeed, it is the now defunct Canadian International Development Agency or
CIDA for short (which has been merged with the Canadian foreign and international trade
ministry) acting on its own or through the Canadian High Commission in Nigeria, that has
loomed large as the principal agent-driver in the era of the Canadian/Nigerian human rights
relationship that is under study here. It is important, however, to note that this kind of statecentrism has not necessarily been replicated at the receiving end of these Canadian human rights
interventions. For, the Canadian institutions have tended to – at the very least – relate with as
many Nigerian non-governmental groups as the governmental bodies. This much is evident from

For example, see DFID Nigeria, “Operational Plan 2011-2016,” online:
<http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/stystem/uploads/attachment_data/file/389311/Nigeria.pdf>.
17
For example, see Obiora C Okafor, “Re-Conceiving "Third World" Legitimate Governance Struggles in Our
Time: Emergent Imperatives for Rights Activism” (2000) 6 Buffalo Hum Rts L Rev 1.
16

some of the contributions to this volume, especially the ones by Ngwaba, and
Ifeakandu/Ngwaba.
As might be expected, over the longer run, the intensity of the engagements at issue has
ebbed and flowed depending on the nature of the socio-political developments on the ground in
both Canada and Nigeria, as well as on the policy shifts that have tended to follow such
developments. Without doubt, the intensity (especially the negative intensity) of the extant
relationship was not as high during the period under study as it was in the era immediately
preceding it, i.e. between 1993 and 1999, when Canada even went as far as shutting down its
diplomatic mission in Nigeria in a rather very public protest at the human rights abuses of the
then ruling military government in that country. Similarly, a certain political development in
Canada – the ascent to power in Canada in 2007 of the super-conservative Harper-led regime –
did affect the intensity of the Canadian/Nigerian (human rights) relationship in more than one
sense. For one, it led to a narrowing of the range of themes on which the Canadians would focus
in Nigeria (as elsewhere in the developing world). It also affected the choice of the specific subareas on which Canada was to focus on. Both the narrowness of the band and the type of issues
to be focused on (maternal/child health and mostly administrative electoral reforms) left
significantly less room for confrontation with the Nigerians. The need for urgent concerted
action on the improvement of maternal/child health was something that was hardly controversial.
In any case, it could hardly be perceived as something that threatened and it in reality did not at
all threaten the hold on power of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party in Nigeria. The electoral
reform issue had more potential to breed confrontation and intensity, since the rigging of the vote
had long been a factor in Nigerian politics; however over-blown in the reportage. Yet, even then,
for reasons beyond the scope of this article, the administrative reform of the electoral process

that Canada supported enjoyed strong support within the ruling party, and was, during the period
under study, in fact the subject of at least one autonomous reform effort in the National
Assembly (Parliament) that it handsomely controlled.18 And President Goodluck Jonathan (who
later became the first sitting democratically-elected Nigerian President to lose an election and to
also concede defeat and congratulate his opponent) was clearly committed to such electoral
reforms during his tenure which began in an acting capacity in January 2010, and appointed a
reformist chief electoral commissioner.19 Conversely, at the Nigerian end, the end of the
dictatorial Abacha regime in Nigeria in 1998 and the enthronement of a significantly more
benign civilian regime the following year could not but have affected the intensity of this
relationship by removing the main reason for the open confrontation that had characterized the
Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship in the immediately preceding era, especially
between 1993 and 1998.
As such, it should come as no surprise that the Canadian-Nigerian human rights
relationship was significantly less confrontational and therefore appreciably more collegial
during the period under study than in the immediately preceding era. This may have been the
result, not just of a much improved human rights environment and a consequent lack of as much
negative intensity in the Canadian-Nigerian human rights relationship, but also of the nature of
the human rights sub-themes on which Canada (by far the main driver of the relationship) largely
focused upon during the period under study.

C. The Heights Attained:
18

The Nigerian Constitution was amended at least twice to facilitate such electoral reform. One such reform
occurred during the period under study. See Thisday, 15 March 2015, online:
<http://www.pressreader/nigeria/thisday/20150315/282050505544125/TextView>.
19
See Connect Africa, “Attahiru Jega Appointed New INEC Helmsman,” online:
<https://connectafrica.wordpress.com/2010/06/09/attahiru-jega-appointed-new-inec-helmsman/>.

Given the paucity of occurrences of Nigeria-to-Canada human rights interventions, a fact that
was noted in the preceding section of this article, virtually all the discussion in this section
focuses on the attainments reached in the context of Canadian interventions in Nigeria. This
important fact ought to be noted at the outset. It should also be noted here that the principal goal
of the discussion here is not so much to offer a finely-grained and precise sense of the extent of
the impact of Canadian human rights interventions in Nigeria. That kind of impact analysis is
beyond the scope/focus of this volume. Rather, the more modest objective here is to map and
identify the heights that have been attained as a result of these Canadian interventions in Nigeria;
in the sense of observing/analyzing the contributions – broadly speaking – of such interventions
to the struggle to advance the enjoyment of human rights in Nigeria during the period under
study. And so, as it is used here, the conception of the phrase “heights attained” is of
contributions to the human rights struggle in Nigeria, and not all that much about the actual
impact of such struggles.
As is reported in Ngwaba’s contribution to this volume, Canadian provision of support
to the Independent National Elections Commission (INEC) of Nigeria and other bodies, for the
reform of the electoral process in Nigeria, formed a central part of Canadian-Nigerian human
rights engagements during the period under study. Working on its own, or with other countries
and international organizations (including through the UN Development Program’s multi-donor
programs, Canada contributed appreciably to the successful conduct by the INEC of federal and
state general elections in Nigeria in early 2011. In addition, some support was extended around
the same time to the National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria (NNHC) for the training of
over one thousand election security officers; and to civil society organizations for the training
and deployment of election observers around the country. While these were important and

valuable attainments in and of themselves, it is unclear the exact extent to which they contributed
to the relative success of the 2011 elections (and subsequent ones). What is clear, though, is that
as the factors that led to this success were multiple and diverse, the contribution of the Canadian
effort to it could only have been partial at best. Nonetheless, it is also clear that without the
Canadian support under discussion, the INEC would have had significantly less resources than it
had to conduct the 2011 elections, and that this sizeable gap in the resources available to that
body would have hampered its work to an appreciable degree. It is also fairly clear that the one
thousand election security officers trained by the NNHC, as a result of Canadian financial
support would likely not have been trained and deployed to the field without that support. And
given the fact that the successful conduct of elections in Nigeria has tended to rest – in part – on
a heavy security presence,20 the appreciable Canadian contribution to that effort was quite
significant.
As was also reported in the article by Ngwaba, many Nigerian human rights NGOs
reported benefiting significantly from the deployment of Canadian resources to this area of the
human rights struggle. This is important, because not being self-conceived as popular
movements which raise funds from among the Nigerian masses, and not being cast in the mould
of the largely member-resourced social/labor/church movements who dot the Nigerian sociopolitical scene, the self-professed Nigerian human rights NGOs have from their very beginnings
been heavily dependent on Canadian and other such foreign sources for almost all their funding,
and indeed for their very survival.21 This said, it should be noted that on the whole, as modest as

20

See Lai Olurode, ed, Election Security in Nigeria: Matters Arising (Abuja: INEC and Fredrich Ebert Stiftung,
2013).
21
See Obiora C Okafor, Legitimizing Human Rights NGOs: Lessons from Nigeria (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa
World Press, 2006) at 123-50.

they have been, these Canadian contributions to the real life enjoyment of human rights in
Nigeria have been quite significant.
Similarly, Canada also contributed significantly during the period under study to the
effort to secure the lived enjoyment of children’s rights in Nigeria. To be precise, Canada has
emphasized children’s health care rights in its engagements with Nigeria, at the very least during
the latest third of the period of the period under study. This is confirmed by the interrogation of
the data conducted in Ifeakandu and Ngwaba’s joint contribution to this volume. The effort to
improve child health has itself included an emphasis on the acceleration of the reduction of
newborn mortality. And while efforts at improving children’s health in Nigeria also long pre-date
and will likely outlive these Canadian interventions and have had a mostly indigenous impetus,
here again it must be noted that the added Canadian resources deployed to this effort could only
have advanced that goal. But even before the more recent emphasis placed on children’s and
maternal health in Canadian human rights interventions in Nigeria, Canada had taken a strong
public stand on the enjoyment of civil/political rights by children (and other age-groups) in
Nigeria. For example, in December 2000, Canada condemned very strongly the trial and
sentencing (to 180 lashes with a cane) by a sharia court in Northern Nigeria of a seventeen yearold girl, Bariya Magazu, who allegedly had (or was cajoled into having) sexual intercourse with
a middle-aged man, and who had become pregnant as a result. The precise extent to which this
strong public condemnation achieved anything at all, including helping to stem the tide of such
trials and sentences, is as hard to measure as it is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it,
however to note that it definitely contributed to the groundswell of public opinion that developed
within and beyond Nigeria against such trials and sentences.22 However, it should also be noted

Rhoda Howard-Hassman, “The Flogging of Bariya Magazu: Nigerian Politics, Canadian Pressures, and Women’s
and Children’s Rights” (2004) 3 J Hum Rts 3.
22

that the intervention of Canada and other Western states in these types of debates in Nigeria may
also have had the unintended negative effect of contributing to the denudation of the popular
legitimacy of some human rights activists in the heavily Muslim sharia law belt of Nigeria.23
The lived enjoyment of women’s rights in Nigeria, especially in the maternal health area
(and not merely the normative proclamation and guarantee of those rights) was the other key
focus of Canadian human rights interventions in Nigeria during the period under study.
Unfortunately, the work that the team did on this particular issue could not be published in this
volume.
The discussion in the preceding paragraphs about the ways in which Canada has
emphasized the lived enjoyment of children’s health rights (and other human rights) provides
some evidence in support of Canada’s contributions during the period under study to the actual
enjoyment of economic/social rights in Nigeria. For, as should be clear, the enjoyment of
satisfactory health is a key socio-economic right. As such, that discussion will not be repeated
here.
Another attainment of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements during the period
under study, in its contributions to the Nigerian human rights struggle, was its significant
deepening, albeit only within a narrower thematic band. For one, as analysis of the evidence
discussed in many of the contributions to this volume would suggest, the formal intergovernmental interactions between the two countries in this area have continued to get denser
than it was during the 1993 to 1999 era when, although Canadian opposition to the then ruling
General Abacha regime was intense, formal interaction between the two countries was most
understandably quite limited. Interestingly, as Ngwaba reports in this volume, this deepening of

See Ayesha Imam & Sindi Medar-Gould, “How not to help Amina Lawal,” Counterpunch (15 May 2003), online:
<http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/05/15/how-not-to-help-amina-lawal/>.
23

the Canadian-Nigerian human rights relationship was not experienced exclusively on the intergovernmental frequency. It has occurred in part as a result of the efforts of the Canada/Africa
Parliamentary Association which was formed in 2003, and which has – among other activities –
been involved in running training programs with Nigerian Parliamentarians. Additionally, as is
reported in Ngwaba’s contribution to this volume, “Canadian government-to-Nigerian NGO”
human rights engagements were also as deep during the period under study as they were even
during the Abacha regime, when the Canadian government strongly supported many Nigerian
NGOs opposed to the Abacha regime. It should also be noted that this deepening CanadianNigerian human rights relationship occurred within the context of a similar deepening in the
general diplomatic/trade relationship between both countries; one that was concretized and
formalized after the end of the period under study when both countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on the establishment of the Canada-Nigeria Bi-National Commission, dealing –
among other things – with human rights; and thereafter concluded a Foreign Investment
Protection Agreement.24

D. The Problems with the Engagements:
As might be fairly expected by the discerning observer of international relations and as is shown
in several of the other contributions to this volume, Canadian/Nigerian human rights
engagements have, at least during the period under study, tended to take the form of a one-way
traffic in which have Canadian’s intervened in Nigerian human rights politics, with the converse
hardly ever being the case. Almost needless to state, this structure of the Canadian/Nigerian
See High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria on the Establishment of the Bi-National Commission”, online:
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/highlightsfaits/2013/BiNationalCommissionNationaleMixte.aspx?lang=en>.
24

human rights relationship reproduces the dominant structure of the global human rights scene,
which also has a largely (though not exclusively) lop-sided one-way traffic structure in which
Western/global North actors exercise dominant agency as the human rights “teachers” while
Third World/global South actors tend to be confined to playing the role of the human rights
“students.”25 It also exemplifies the bifurcated character of the lived experience of the
(non)enjoyment of state/popular sovereignty. For, regardless of the much-touted
denudation/withering of state sovereignty, some states and peoples are – in “Animal Farm” type
terms – clearly more sovereign than others. What is more, it also reinforces the available
evidence of the conceptual and actual division of our world by a binary heaven/hell dichotomy in
which there are certain human rights heavens (such as Canada) and certain human rights hells
(such as Nigeria), necessitating the unidirectional flow of human rights knowledge, resources,
advice and instruction from the heaven-like parts of our world to the hellish portions.26 As has
been argued elsewhere, these binaries are as real as they are highly problematic.27 And while
nothing that has been pointed out here should be all that surprising to the discerning observer, all
the claims that are being made are supported by the evidence analyzed in this volume.
A related problem with Canadian/Nigerian human rights relations is the seemingly
widespread assumption by Nigerian government officials and human rights NGOs that Nigeria
has little or nothing to “give” to Canada in this relationship. The comments made by officials of
many of the Nigerian NGOs interviewed by researchers involved in the study that underpins this
volume (for example, as is reported in Ngwaba’s contribution) are heavily laden with this
assumption. The assumption is also implicit in the near-total absence of “Nigerian-to-Canadian”
See Okafor & Agbakwa, supra note 8; and J Oloka Onyango and Sylvia Tamale, “‘The Personal is Political,’ or
Why Women’s Rights are Indeed Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism” (1995) 17
Hum Rts Q 691.
26
Ibid. See also Akuffo, supra note 6 at 49-82.
27
Ibid.
25

interventions during the relevant period. The point that is being made here is that there is an
ideational (and not merely a material) underpinning to Nigeria’s seeming confinement within its
human rights relationship with Canada to the role of the “student” and the “recipient” of human
rights assistance. Such an assumption is also deeply ingrained in Canada’s self-image and
identity as a middle power and has found its way into its foreign policy.28 Needless to state, there
are no human rights heavens in our world as we now know it. And Canada could learn a fair bit
from Nigeria in certain areas, such as the treatment of the elderly, the negative consequences on
the enjoyment of human rights of the dumping of toxic waste in poorer countries, and the
balance between peace and justice. Yet, aside from the engagements that Canada and Nigeria
would have had at the UN in relation to the toxic waste agenda (as discussed in Owie’s
contribution to this volume), there was little, if any, flow of human rights knowledge from the
Nigerian to the Canadian end.
Also related to these last two points is the over-emphasis on the deployment of
Canadian aid/development assistance to Nigeria in the Canadian-Nigerian (human rights)
relationship and the consequent “othering” of Nigeria (and the rest of the African continent). 29
Akuffo has shown how this “othering” process resulted from the construction of Canada’s moral
identity as a caring, humanitarian and good international citizen, partly in juxtaposition to the
construction of African states such as Nigeria as conflict-ridden and poor and as requiring the
benevolent assistance of countries such as Canada, especially through development assistance.30
Interestingly, as has been shown earlier on in this section, these separate images of Canada and
Nigeria are widely shared within Nigeria itself, and especially among the human rights NGO
community. To be clear, the point here is not necessarily that there may not be the need in
28
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Nigeria for some human rights aid from countries such as Canada. Rather it is that the overemphasis that has been placed thus far on such aid has been problematic, given other alternatives
paradigms for the structuring of the Canadian/Nigerian relationship, including innovative ones
such as supporting with tax breaks and the like, Nigerians resident in Canada who remit funds
back home and in the result ensure that millions attend school, get better healthcare, etc.
Another problem with Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements during the period
under study was its significantly narrower focus (driven largely by the foreign policy of the
Harper-led conservative government that governed Canada for most of the relevant period).
During this period, Canadian interventions in the Nigerian human rights scene tended to focus
quite heavily on the lived enjoyment of maternal/child health and the reform of the electoral
process. Canadian interventions on Nigerian human rights scene were not as restricted during the
immediately preceding ten years (especially between1993 and 1999). And as a result of their
narrow breadth, Canadian interventions during the period under study tended to de-emphasize a
number of human right concerns that are also very important to Nigerians; including support to
the agency responsible for curbing human trafficking, especially the trafficking of women and
children, in Nigeria.31 This much is reported is explicit in comments made by one informant who
has insider knowledge of the matter.32 Noteworthy here as well is that this particularly important
gap in the range of Canadian human rights interventions in Nigeria existed alongside a highly
public professing of Canada’s strong commitment to the amelioration/elimination of human
trafficking. And as was shown in my contribution to this volume on the theoretical implications
of the study, relatively little attention has also been paid, at least in public, in these Canadian
human rights interventions in Nigeria to the advancement of labor rights (including in relation to
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the privatization of certain industries). This, as has been noted elsewhere in this volume,
occurred in spite the intensity of labor-led struggles in Nigeria during the period under study.
Thus, it is fair to say that the lack of diversification in the themes on which Canada’s human
rights interventions in Nigeria focused on during the period under study was problematic.
As importantly, there was very little contact between the national human rights
institutions of both countries during the period under study. This much is evident from the
interview conducted by researchers conducting this study with a senior official of the Canadian
Human Rights Commission. It is also supported by similar interviews conducted at the National
Human Rights Commission of Nigeria. Needless to say, this is problematic from the point of
view of the development of the Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship. Clearly, a situation
in which the principal official human rights bodies in both countries have hardly, if ever,
engaged with each other does not augur well for the systematic and knowledge-based
development of their human rights relations. Given the support that Canada has extended to the
NNHC, the much closer involvement of the CHRC in such efforts would have bolstered
Canada’s overall contribution to this key Nigerian human rights agency.
What is more, the fact that – as we have seen in some of the various contributions to this
volume – Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements during the period under study were
mostly driven by governmental actors on the Canadian side is somewhat problematic. This is so
because it diminished the role that Canadian non-governmental actors could have played leading
to greater diversity of knowledge and approaches and widening/deepening the reach and impact
of the interventions on the Canadian side. Given the greater dexterity with which these actors
tend to navigate the challenges of public communication and information dissemination, the
involvement of these Canadian non-governmental actors might even have led to an increase in

the visibility of the Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship in both countries. It is not being
contended that Canadian non-governmental actors have not been involved at all in the
Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship. Rather these actors have not played as key a role
as they could have. For their own part, the Nigerian NGOs are already heavily involved in the
relationship, albeit as recipients of Canadian resource assistance.
Another problem with Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements in general during
the period under study was that it was not as visible as it could have been, at least among the
public in Nigeria. For example, as some of the field research that grounds the articles published
in this volume show, even many senior Nigerian NGO operatives (members of a community that
tends to rely heavily on foreign funding) and some senior staff of the Committee on Human
Rights of the House of Representatives of Nigeria (the lower house of parliament) do not appear
to be much aware of Canadian/Nigerian engagements in the human rights area.33 If these
engagements have not been sufficiently visible to these highly educated and well-positioned key
actors on the Nigerian human rights scene, then there is clearly a gaping hole in their visibility
within Nigeria. While the research did not find any evidence with which to measure the visibility
or otherwise of the extent relationship in Canada, given that the Canadian/Nigerian human rights
relationship has in reality almost entirely meant that it was Canada who intervened in Nigeria,
and that the reverse has almost never been the case, then the lack of its visibility in Nigeria is
much more important than the possibility of its relative obscurity in Canada.

D. The Prospects of the Engagements:

33

For instance, see Interview of Informant 12 (5 November 2014) at Gemstone meeting point, Area 11, Garki, Abuja
(On file with author).

In terms of the prospects of Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements, it should be noted at
the outset that lacking a crystal ball with which to see the future, in reaching one’s conclusions,
one can only rely on and extrapolate from the available evidence. First, it should be fairly clear
that the conclusion and adoption in 2012 of the Canada/Nigeria Memorandum of Agreement on a
Bi-National Commission, the subsequent convening and holding of at least two high-level
meetings of that Commission; and the adoption in 2014 of the Canada-Nigeria Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, will suffice here to indicate the undulating, but
generally rising, tempo in the last several years of the general Canadian/Nigerian bi-lateral
relationship.34 In the meantime, the trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries has
intensified in near-exponential terms.35 This has been so despite the fact that some may have
perceived a slight slowdown in the intensification of that relation between 2014 and the hotly
contested 2015 general elections in Nigeria. While this may not necessarily result in as much of a
rise in the tempo of the human rights-related interactions of the two countries, it is suggestive of
an upward or at least stable (rather than negative) trend in the trajectory of such relations. What
is more, it is within reason to expect that the expected rise in the density of diplomatic/trade
interaction between the two countries will likely lead to some appreciable rise in the density and
intensity of their human rights relations. One catalyst for this may be the increased attention by
Canadian civil society on human rights issues in Nigeria and the consequent pressure on the
Canadian government to “do something” about any perceived problems in that area.
Secondly, this increased attention by Canadian civil society may lead to the greater
visibility overall – especially within Canada – of the Canadian/Nigerian human rights
relationship. What is more, the ongoing expansion and deepening of the trade and other relations
See High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, “Canada – Nigeria Relations”, online:
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between Canada and Nigeria will (apart from inviting more attention by Canadian civil society to
the human rights engagements between both countries) also help in a direct way to render those
engagements more visible in Canada. Elements within Nigerian civil society and officials of the
Canadian mission in Nigeria also need to make greater effort to increase the visibility of
Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements in Nigeria.
Thirdly, and somewhat unfortunately, the one-way traffic that more or less defines the
Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship is unlikely to give way any time soon. This is
largely because of the reality of the existence of a better (albeit not perfect) human rights
environment in Canada as opposed to Nigeria; the economic power asymmetry between the two
countries which is in Canada’s favor; and the powerful effect of the circulation in the minds of
all-too-many Canadians and Nigerians of the heaven/hell binary image of the good West (a la
Canada) and the bad Third World (a la Nigeria). If Canada is a near-heaven and Nigeria is a
near-hell, or so the reading of these images go, then the direction of the flow of human rights
“aid” should be obvious: from the heavenly side of the relationship to its hellish counterpart.
Baring some radical restructuring of our world, this deep structure of the relationship is unlikely
to change in the near future.
As such, barring any sudden seismic shift in Canadian foreign attitudes and policy
toward Nigeria and unless there is a radical change in the mentalities and policies of Nigerian
governmental and non-governmental actors, the Canadian/Nigerian human rights relationship
will continue to over-emphasize “aid” to Nigeria for quite some time, and do so without
suggesting that the converse become the case. In the result, to deploy Edward Akuffo’s point
about the images of African countries in Canadian foreign policy, Nigeria will continue to be

constructed and treated as Canada “other,”36 both in a general sense and also in terms of the
specificity of their human rights engagements.
It should also be clear from many of the other contributions to this volume that unless
there is a regime change in Canada following the 2015 federal parliamentary elections, the overconcentration of Canadian human rights interventions in Nigeria on a significantly narrow band
of issues (namely maternal/child health and electoral reform) will continue to be the case – at
least in the near future. This will be so largely because the current policy decision to focus
narrowly (especially on maternal/child health) is the “brainchild” and “pet project” of the
Harper-led conservative government that has governed Canada for at least eight of the years
immediately preceding that general election.37
And lastly, it appears that Canadian governmental actors will – for the most part –
continue to drive the human rights engagements between Canada and Nigeria for some time to
come. Canadian and Nigerian NGOs will alongside the Nigerian government continue to play
more marginal roles in these relations. Thus, baring some radical change in Nigerian government
policy and a sea change in the way Nigerian NGOs raise their funds, the Nigerian actors in this
relationship will continue to largely act as the recipients (as opposed to the givers) of human
rights aid.

E. Some Recommendations:
It would not require all that much imagination to envisage that most of the recommendations that
would flow from this study would in a sense be the flip side of the problems already identified in
this volume with Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements during the period under study.
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For, after all, any recommendations offered here would be designed to strengthen and refine
these engagements, and concomitantly, to ameliorate or address the problems that have been
identified as afflicting the engagements would be to strengthen these engagements in significant
measure. With this in mind, here are the recommendations that the contributors to this volume
would make to policy-makers, practitioners and theorists alike (depending on which of the
itemized points they find relevant):

1. There is a need to redress the one-way traffic character of Canadian-Nigerian human rights
engagements, in order to make the relationship much more of a partnership and less of a kind of
internship experience for the Nigerians. The relationship is way too lopsided at the moment.

2. The activities that constitute Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements should be made
significantly more visible in both countries. A greater involvement of Canadian nongovernmental actors (NGOs especially) in the relationship would help further this goal, since
these actors are usually well-skilled in the execution of the necessary kinds of dissemination
tactics, strategies and activities.

3. The substantive scope of these human rights engagements need to be broadened significantly
(way beyond the current over-emphasis on the slim menu of maternal/child health and electoral
reform) in order to accommodate other key human rights concerns of ordinary Nigerians and
Canadians. This broadening will make the human rights relationship between the two countries
more relevant to the bulk of the population in Nigeria, as well as in Canada. Importantly, the

implementation of this recommendation need not necessarily require additional funding. It is
often sufficient to simply speak about these issues with the other country in a respectful way.

4. There is a sense in which Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements also need to be
deepened to avoid a mismatch of sorts, and attune them to addressing more systematically the
strongest priorities of a larger majority of Nigerians and Canadians. For instance, the relationship
cannot (as it seems to have largely done thus far) simply avoid the very important question of the
enjoyment of labor rights in Nigeria in the context of privatization, de-regulation, and foreign
investment. If this issue has been addressed at all by Canadian human rights interventions in
Nigeria, it has not been in a visible enough way. For its own part, Nigeria has hardly, if ever,
intervened in Canadian human rights struggles.

5. The near-total absence of a significant relationship between the national human rights
institutions of both countries needs to be remedied. The Canadian Human Rights Commission is,
even by its admission, too heavily oriented toward cooperation with countries such as Australia
and New Zealand. And while the Canadian High Commission has engaged with the Nigerian
National Human Rights Commission, this ought not replace the building of a relationship
between the two national human rights bodies mentioned here.

6. There is a need to strengthen and expand the role played by Canadian (as opposed to
Nigerian) non-governmental actors in driving and participating in the relationship. This will not
only help make Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements more visible in both countries, but
bring a greater diversify of knowledge, skills and methods to the human rights interaction

between the two countries. For their own part, the Nigerian NGOs are already heavily involved
in the process, albeit not as drivers, but largely as participants, aid recipients and native
informants.

7. The ongoing intensification of the Canadian-Nigerian relationship in general and their human
rights engagements in particular should be strongly encouraged. This bodes well for the
relationship between the two countries, including their human rights engagements. Given the
relatively non-imperial ambitions of Canadian foreign policy,38 at least until recently, and against
the background that there is less of a power differential between Canada and Nigeria than say the
USA and Nigeria, an intensified relationship between Canada and Nigeria has a greater chance
of leading to certain mutual benefits than one with the strongest, historically more imperial,
countries. This is not to say that Canadian foreign policy has been completely innocent, but to
make an assessment about the relative advantage of an intensified Canadian-Nigeria relationship
vis-à-vis some other possibilities. However, at the same time, much more care must be taken to
ameliorate the one-way traffic character of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements.

8. The exchange of knowledge and resources (and not simply or necessarily the current overemphasis on “aid”) between the Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria and
various Canadian actors should be strongly encouraged. This will help consolidate recent
tremendous gains in the efficiency and integrity of the Nigerian electoral process. Again, while
electoral ills are not absent in Canada, they occur at a much lesser rate than in Nigeria. And so,
Canada is also not without a need for electoral reform; however lesser that need is. As such, an
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exchange of knowledge and resources between the two countries will likely be mutually
beneficial, and especially so for the Nigerians.

